Phantoms of Power: Part-III

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by Aziz Ali Dad

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The movement for Gilgit-Baltistan’s independence is often obscured by partisan memory, subjective narratives, personal bias and sectarian interpretations. Hence, to move beyond this haze, an objective, scholarly and critical analysis is needed to understand the complex factors that catalysed the revolt against the rule of the Dogras of Kashmir, assess the role of the ‘Revolutionary Council’ that spearheaded the independence movement, and the underlying reasons for its subsequent failure to sustain the independence.

In the short-lived independence of Gilgit-Baltistan, declared on November 1, 1947, the civilian dimension is almost non-existent. In its absence, the military narrative has dominated the history of the independence movement. Its figurehead, President Shah Raees Khan, then Raja of Gilgit, presided over the newly independent Jamhooriya (republic) of Gilgit-Baltistan that collapsed within sixteen days.

The freedom movement did not yield more freedoms because the leadership that got freedom from Dogra rule but did not have idea about freedom for what. The failure underscored the lack of political leadership. While the Scouts constituted a decisive military force capable of triggering revolution, their officer cadre was ill-equipped to transition from rebels to rulers. They possessed no political platform, administrative vision, or popular mandate to consolidate the independence. This critical void created a power vacuum that was swiftly filled by Pakistan’s military and civil bureaucracy, setting a precedent for decades of indirect rule. The enduring consequence was not self-determination, but a legacy of political alienation and centralised control, as the region’s fate was decided by military action alone, without the sustaining force of political institution.

The confusion and myopic vision can be imagined from the fact that the president of Gilgit-Baltistan, Raja Shah Rais Khan, preferred to abjure his position as the head of state and representative of people to a magistrate from the south, and opted for a position of civil supply officer at commissariat in Gilgit. This mentality still pervades in political leadership and social fabric of Gilgit-Baltistan. It is evident from the act of elected members of Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly who resign from their position to join as judges in the judiciary.

The Revolutionary Council’s decision to annex Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan on November 16, 1947, without any conditions or constitutional guarantees, and its consequences are evident in the events that followed. With the transfer of reign to an officer of the federal government, the Gilgit Scouts’ power started to wane. Also, the power of military leadership that spearheaded the war of independence against the Kashmiri Dogras was curtailed by Pakistan’s military brass and civil administration, which took the reins of power into their hands.

On October 26, 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir signed the instrument of Accession with India, seeking its help to quell the revolt in Kashmir and Gilgit, while the ‘Revolutionary Council’ sought help from Pakistan. Instead of helping Gilgit Scouts, Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracy suspended the Council and took charge of the region. Owing to the subservience of the region to Pakistani administrative control, nationalist political leaders deem independence from Dogra meaningless and a mere change of guards.

Since 1947, the region has been managed through the executive pillar of the state of Pakistan. Martin Sökefeld, in his magisterial paper ‘From colonialism to postcolonial colonialism: Changing Modes of Domination in the Northern Areas of Pakistan’, sees the shift of power from local to the Centre as a passage from colonialism to postcolonial colonialism.

The modern history of Gilgit-Baltistan often appears anomalous to most historians in Pakistan. The reason for this discordant note in the symphony of nation-building stems from its ever-mutating status and the region’s historical trajectory and collective memory, which set it apart from the mainstream political current of the Indian subcontinent in the first half of the last century. Despite this different historical experience, the history of Gilgit-Baltistan converged with Pakistan following the armed uprising of the subalterns from Gilgit Scouts, which overthrew Dogra rule. Subsequently, the government of Gilgit-Baltistan, under the leadership of President Shah Raees Khan, acceded to Pakistan.

The majority of scholars on the history of Gilgit-Baltistan tend to see Gilgit-Baltistan’s Independence Movement as a military revolt. As a corollary, this perspective erases any traces of civilians or political cadre in the independence of the region. However, this movement can be treated as the first event in the modern era, which encompassed the whole of Gilgit-Baltistan and Ladakh.

Local writers also subscribe to the military version of the history of the independence movement. That is why they present it as a total military undertaking with no involvement of civilians or local politicians. Local writers such as Colonel Mirza Hassan Khan, Haq Nawaz, Abdul Manan, Shah Khan, Professor Usman Ali, and Captain Baber Khan appear to be treating the war of independence as a military affair, as their narrations mainly cover military personalities or events related to the armed struggle fought by the Gilgit Scouts.

• Also read:
• Phantoms of Power in Gilgit-Baltistan-I
• Phantoms of Power in Gilgit-Baltistan: Power and Pandemonium-II
• Hunza State at Twilight
• Untangling Wakhan Quadrangle
• Hunza Matters: Unmaking and Making
• Psychopathology and societal malaise of Gilgit-Baltistan

From Colonel Mirza Hassan’s narrative, one gets the impression that he was the sole mind and muscle behind Gilgit-Baltistan’s War of Independence. He indirectly disparages Captain Shah Khan in subliminal language typical of Gilgit by dubbing him as a minion who always ‘lived under Major Brown like a shadow’. Hassan belonged to the Rono tribe. However, he introduces himself as Jaraal in the first edition of his autobiography ‘Shamsheer Say Zanjeer Tak’ (from Sword to Chain) published in 2010. He claims to be a descendant of a race that once ruled Gilgit. His book contains his full name as Colonel Mirza Hassan Khan Rono Jaraal. Jaraal is a Muslim Rajput tribe with cultural roots in Jammu and Kashmir. This indicates confusion in the mind of Col Hassan regarding his own identity and the overall status of Gilgit-Baltistan vis-à-vis Jammu and Kashmir.

Nevertheless, he claims to be the in-charge of deciding the future identity of Gilgit-Baltistan. It shows the ambiguity at the heart of the movement for independence from the Dogra rule of Kashmir. Interestingly, the third edition of his book deletes both words Rono and Jaraal, but adds military Cross and Fakhr-e-Kashmir (Pride of Kashmir). Also, the content of the book keeps changing with each new edition, which is impossible in the genre of autobiography. It seems that some invisible hands are fiddling with the autobiography.

Soon after independence from the Dogras, Col Hassan developed differences with the Pakistani Establishment. It is claimed that he fell out of favour with the Pakistani state because he wanted to establish an independent United States of Gilgit. Even within Gilgit-Baltistan, a certain group see this effort to be a camouflage to establish a Shia state.

While writing about a consultative meeting for the setting up of an interim government in the liberated Gilgit-Baltistan, Major Brown specifically mentions Colonel Hassan and other members of the delegation, including Raja Shah Raees Khan, Mirza Hassan, Shah Sultan and Jan Alam as the Shia contingent. Whereas, the other side included Jamadar Shah Khan, Shah Zaman of Punial, and Jamadhar Akber Hussain. However, he does not call the later group with any sectarian epithet.

Haq Nawaz’s Jang-e-Azadi-e-Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir: Sazishain or Haqaiq (War of Independence of Gilgit-Baltistan Kashmir: Conspiracies and Facts) attempts to sift facts from conspiracies but ends up weaving even more conspiracies in his narrative. To his credit, Haq Nawaz brings up the controversial issue of an alleged letter of Col Hassan Khan to a Paish Imam (mosque’s prayer leader) in Srinagar, to the fore. The letter is allegedly written with the idea of establishing a Shia state in the Northern Areas.

Haq Nawaz accuses Prof Usman Ali of trying to downgrade the role Col Hassan Khan in Gilgit-Baltistan’s independence movement. In the preface of his book, Haq Nawaz, particularly, mentioned his meeting with Prof Usman, where he showed him the alleged letter and a copy of Hassan’s book. He alleges that Usman warned him not to mention Col Hassan Khan as the hero of independence. In the same vein, Nawaz attributes the propaganda against Col Hassan, for purportedly trying to establish Shia state, to the British because they sow the seed of conspiracy to pit Shia, Sunni, Ismailis, and Noorbakhshis against each other. Later the same sectarian narrative is picked by the Pakistani Establishment to divide people of the region along sectarian lines.

Nawaz’s book contains a review and analysis of the content by Colonel (retd) Nadir Hassan Khan, son of the late Col Hassan Khan. Nadir denies the allegation against his father being a sectarian bigot because both Sunni and Shia soldiers of the Gilgit Scouts respected him alike. To validate his claims, he laid emphasis that Col Hassan commanded Gilgit Scouts successfully because he was respected by all the soldiers. Interestingly, he gives the exact number of Shias and Sunnis serving in Gilgit Scouts, but fails to mention Ismailis, who formed bulk of the Gilgit Scouts.

Contrary to the claims of Col Nadir, Colonel (later Group Captain) Shah Khan asserts that it was he and Captain Baber who commanded the respect of the majority sepoys from Hunza, Nager and Ghizer. According to Shah Khan, “the Scouts consisted of a strength of three companies — Hunza and Nager providing one company each, while the third consisted of four platoons made up by Punial, Yasin, Gupis and Gilgit with a strength of fifty men each. According to Shah Khan total number of the Gilgit Scouts was 582, but it was raised to 1,500 on war footing to fight against the Dogras.

It is important to mention that both Shah Khan and Baber Khan hailed from royal families of Hunza and Nager respectively. Therefore, they seemed not to be treating other veterans, including Colonel Hassan Khan, as the leaders of the independence movement. Though Col Shah Khan liberally mentions the exploits and contributions of Col Hassan to the war of independence of Gilgit-Baltistan, he falls short of declaring him as the leader of independence. Instead, he minces no words in declaring himself and Captain Baber Khan as the sole leaders of the independence of Gilgit-Baltistan. He goes to the extent of claiming that without them, the independence of Gilgit-Baltistan would not have been possible. He writes, ‘The leading spirits of this movement were two figures, namely Subedar Major Baber Khan and myself. Had we two not been there or had either one of us backed out, the movement would have died there and then.’

Abdul Manan, in his autobiography ‘Doi’yaa’an Say Zojeela Tak: Mera Safar-e-Jihad (From Doi’yaa’an to Zojeela: My Journey of Jihad)’ covers a sizable portion related to War of Independence of Gilgit-Baltistan, but he gives a different name to this movement. His narration is tinged with invisible sectarian sentiments. He calls it as “Jihad-e-Azaadi (Jihad for independence)”. Since Manan was the former Ameer of Jamaat-i-Islami Gilgit-Baltistan, he gives an ideological twist from the Jamaat’s point of view.

Though the military brass of Gilgit Scouts were spearheading the Independence Movement, Manan, throughout his narration, terms the war veterans as Mujahideen. Col Shah Khan and Capt Baber Khan never used the word ‘Mujahideen’ for the veterans and martyrs. The description of the War of Independence in the writings of Captain Baber, Col Mirza Hassan and Col Shah Khan is replete with military nomenclature like commandant, orderly, JCO, VCO, garrison, company, platoon, corps, weapons, planning, attacks etc. Manan seems to disapprove of Col Hassan Khan and accuses him of being stubborn and bigot without mentioning whether the bigotry was racial or sectarian in nature. He claims that for this reason, the people of Astore did not support him. Also, Manan holds Col Hassan Khan responsible for the blunder of leaving the Qamri and Minimurg area of Astore to spent winter in main Astore. This provided an opportunity for Dogra forces to recapture these areas.

Overall, the book of Haq Nawaz and Abdul Manan attempts to rehabilitate role of ulema in the history of independence. Both claim that it was Qazi Abdul Manan from Jamia Masjid Gilgit who first issued the fatwa (edict) against Dogra rule in Gilgit-Baltistan. Following his suit, Moulana Muhammed Shoaib, Molvi Mir Subhan, Molvi Abdul Rauf, Mir Zaman and Molvi Rehmat Khan from Chilas, Molvi Hassan from Goharabad, and Molvi Abul Farah from Gilgit gave their edicts of war and advised soldiers regarding the legitimacy of war. Other Sunni ulema included are Moulana Abul Hasnat and Moulana Abdul Haye.

The Shia scholars mentioned by both are: Shah Sahib of Amphary, and Sheikh Kaseer. However, they fail to mention any Ismaili religious leaders. This erasure can be seen as a commission by intent than the unconscious omission.

Usman Ali, in his book ‘Gilgit ka Inqalab 1947’ (Revolution of Gilgit), mostly covers the military aspects and does not explore the political aspect of the military revolt and armed struggle. Usman has compiled writings about the idea behind the independence of Gilgit in his edited book ‘Gilgit: Nazariya Aur Azaadi’. But the idea discussed in the book appears to be the microcopy of the ideology of Pakistan applied to Gilgit-Baltistan. Thus, the total erasure of local perspective on the event unfolded during the time of the flight of Dogras from the region. Contrary to Usman’s view, the fact is that there was no branch or presence of All India Muslim League in Gilgit during the time of revolt against Dogra rule.

Among the historian, only Ghulam Rasul in his book ‘Azad-e-Gilgit-Baltistan Aur Haqaiq’ (Independence of Gilgit-Baltistan and Realities) sheds light on the role of civilians and touches political aspects of the struggle.

Martin Sökefeld claims that a civilian named Mohammad Ali Changezi found secret society that served in preparing the revolt, the Tanzeem-e-Sarfröshän (Organisation of Martyres) “with the explicit purpose of working for the merger of the Gilgit Agency with Pakistan.” However, Captain Baber Khan claims that he established ‘Anjuman-e-Sarfroshaan’ (Society of Martyres) in secrecy with the support of Shah Rais Khan as an alternative arrangement in case the cadre of Gilgit Scouts get arrested by Dogras. It seems to be same organization. At the initial stage, this organization inducted a headmaster, cleric, shopkeeper and few clerics into its fold. By November 1, 1947, the Anjuman succeeded to mobilise 500 civilians to participate in the war of independence. It seems that the civilians’ role was confined to mobilising masses to support the war of independence.

Recently, some personal accounts and letters have surfaced showing the activities of different civilian activists. One such case is that of Moulvi Abul Farah from Gilgit. He mobilised people in Gilgit under the banner of Jawanaan Jamaa’t-e-Janbazän (Youth of Organisation of Martyres). It is claimed that in Darel and Tangir Valleys of Diamer, thousands of mujahideen were mobilised by ulema to participate in the war against Dogras. This is testified by Col Hassan Khan, the leader of the Revolutionary Council, and Brigadier Mahboob Khan. However, the mujahedin (holy warriors) did not participate in the war as the Dogras were ousted before they could join the soldiers fighting against them.

Details of all the civilians who joined the movement are scant. However, from the oral testimonies and stories of their family members, one can infer that they hail from diverse ethnic, professional, regional, ethnic and religious backgrounds. These include convicted criminals who were released from jails by the local officers of Gilgit Scouts.

Captain Baber Khan is of the opinion that the civilians were afraid of firepower of Dogra forces. That is why they did not support it openly. One of the reasons Gilgit Scouts attacked Daras was to capture the tehsildar of Astore — Wazir Muhammed Ashraf Khan. He was accused of supporting Dogras. Wazir Ashraf is the first person from Gilgit-Baltistan who graduated from Aligarh University. During the attack on Daras by Gilgit Scouts, he was with Captain Kashmir Singh in a rest house. Manan accuses the people of Qamri and Minimarg of feeding Dogra Hindu officers against the freedom fighters terming them as savage and marauding forces.

Colonel Shah Khan claims that the coup was engineered purely by the VCO’s of the Gilgit Scouts. He further writes, ‘These VCO’s contacted some civilians, close relatives and friends but most of them expressed their inability to cooperate. For the civilians, it was a foolish drama being enacted by a handful of mad people. A few of them who had previously assured their support adopted silence after the fire power display at Gilgit. They clearly told us to refrain from such activities which were simply suicidal.’

Overall, dissension and contradictions within its leadership mark the local narrative about the independence of Gilgit-Baltistan as subsumed. This has made the local historiography more subjective and presentation skewed.

Secondly, the subaltern perspective is missing in overall historiography of independence movement of Gilgit-Baltistan, though majority of veterans and even their local officers were doubly subaltern to Dogra forces and the British.

In the next article, we will try to map out the political landscape and tendencies emerging in Gilgit-Baltistan during the post-colonial period. (To be Continued)