By Amin Beg
The Gilgit-Baltistan Land Reforms Act, 2025, passed by the region’s Assembly last week in haste has sparked widespread controversy and alarm, revealing deep legal ambiguities and institutional flaws that could pave the way for elite capture and systemic land grabbing.
At the heart of the dispute lies the bill’s vague definition of “Government Land,” which risks the arbitrary reclassification of ancestral and communal lands, especially in areas lacking formal land records.
Compounding the concern is the bill’s absence of judicial oversight, provision of immunity to officials, and the authorisation of summary evictions without due process, creating a framework that erodes accountability while sidelining indigenous voices.
The introduction of the bill in the Assembly triggered immediate backlash. Opposition lawmakers led by Kazim Mesum, Leader of the Opposition in the house staged a dramatic walkout, condemning the bill as a covert attempt to bypass public consultation.
“The rivers, mountains, barren lands, and settlements belong to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan,” Mesum declared. “We will not let anyone take them from the indigenous communities.”
Nawaz Khan Naji, a firebrand legislator and leader of the Balawaristan National Front (BNF) went further, tearing up the bill on the Assembly floor and urging mass mobilisation: “We must be prepared to sacrifice for the protection of our ancestral lands.”
Chief Minister Haji Gulbar Khan defended the bill claiming it underwent a thorough review process with inputs from Establishment and bureaucracy.
Gulbar’s coalition partner and PPP regional head Amjad Hussain argued that the new law aims to dismantle arguably the centuries-old “Khalisa Sarkar” system —a relic of colonial Dogra rule that designated vast stretches of land as state property—and restores barren lands to local communities.
By replacing the exploitative Khalisa Sarkar model with an equally extractive bureaucratic regime, the government risks deepening local alienation and accelerating environmental degradation.”
However, critics contend that the reforms are cosmetic and mask a deeper agenda: centralising land control under bureaucratic authority while facilitating exploitation by commercial and political elites.
Ill-conceived and ill-timed move
The Act’s timing has only deepened suspicions of political suppression and a lack of democratic due process as prominent leaders of the Awami Action Committee Gilgit-Baltistan (AAC-GB), including its chairperson Ehsan Ali Advocate and other senior leaders were put behind bars ahead of Grand Qaumi Jirga (Grand National Consultation) convened by the AAC for May 24 and introduction of the bill.
The AAC-GB, an umbrella of Leftist, nationalist and religious parties’ as well as civil society voiced sharp criticism. They argue that the legislation disregards local ownership, suppresses dissent, and undermines both customary land rights and the region’s unique constitutional status.
Silencing opposition voices and suppressing alternative proposals damages democratic credibility.
The exclusion of key stakeholders, particularly leaders of the AAC who remain incarcerated, casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of the consultation process. Silencing opposition voices and suppressing alternative proposals damages democratic credibility. Immediate release of these leaders and inclusion of diverse perspectives is essential for any meaningful reform.
Legal and institutional ambiguities
The Act contains serious legal ambiguities and institutional weaknesses that risk facilitating elite capture and land grabbing. The Act’s vague definition of “Government Land” allows for the misclassification of ancestral and communal lands, particularly in unsettled areas lacking formal records and documentation.
It provides no judicial recourse for affected communities and grants sweeping powers, including eviction without due process and legal immunity for officials. These provisions undermine accountability and open the door to elite capture and land grabs.
The Act’s vague definition of “Government Land” allows for the misclassification of ancestral and communal lands, particularly in unsettled areas lacking formal records and documentation
The absence of judicial oversight and appeal mechanisms prevents affected communities from challenging arbitrary decisions. Provisions granting immunity to officials and enabling summary evictions without due process further erode accountability.
Undermining G-B’s disputed status
Gilgit-Baltistan remains outside the constitutional framework of Pakistan. Recognized by the UN as part of the larger Kashmir dispute, the region is administered by Pakistan pending a final resolution through a plebiscite. The bill if signed into Act will jeopardise Pakistan’s stated position on the Kashmir dispute. Any unilateral land reforms in Gilgit-Baltistan may be construed as an attempt to alter the territory’s status, weakening Pakistan’s stance under UN resolutions and at a time of heightened regional tensions.
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Such actions also infringe upon the fundamental human and land rights of a population residing in a territory of unresolved legal status.
Breach of the 1947 Deed of Accession
When the princely states of Hunza and Nagar acceded to Pakistan in November 1947, the terms of accession were limited to defence, external affairs, and communications, consistent with the arrangements for other princely states at the time. These states retained autonomy over internal matters, including land and resource governance. Any federal intervention that alters land ownership or exploits natural resources without the explicit consent of local communities contravenes these original terms, undermining both historical agreements and the trust of indigenous populations.
Customary law and legal pluralism
For generations, natural resource management in Gilgit-Baltistan has been governed by rawaj (customary law) rooted in oral traditions, collective wisdom, community consensus, and indigenous institutions. These norms have withstood external pressures, including colonial policies and Pakistan’s administrative integration since 1974.
Despite state efforts to impose statutory laws for revenue or conservation, customary practices continue to effectively regulate use of resources — forests, pastures, water, and conservation of wildlife. They ensure equitable access, penalise misuse, and promote collective stewardship—attributes often lacking in centralised bureaucratic systems. Scholars recognise this as a polycentric legal order, where state and non-state systems coexist.
The Land Reforms Act, however, disregards this pluralism. By displacing well-established customary frameworks, it risks creating legal vacuums, weakening enforcement capacity, and accelerating environmental degradation and social disenfranchisement.
Flaws and key public concerns
Public critique from opposition lawmakers, political activists, civil society, and legal experts highlights several major flaws in the current Act:
— The Act lacks community consent as there is no provision for prior informed consent from local communities before leasing or reclassifying communal lands.
— The bill reinforces centralised bureaucratic control, excluding local institutions and traditional decision-making bodies.
— It disregards rawaj (customary law). The Act neither recognises rawaj nor integrates it into the legal framework.
— The law has opaque leasing mechanisms. Vague procedures for leasing and land reclassification increase the risk of exploitation by political and corporate elites.
Codifying customary law: a way forward
Rather than imposing top-down legislation, Islamabad and G-B authorities should recognise and codify the existing customary legal framework into formal law. Key elements of such a community-first approach include:
— Recognition of all communal land, pastures, forests, and water sources—from mountaintops to riverbeds— as belonging to local communities.
— At least 80% of households of a village, must approve any lease or development project.
— All land management and development initiatives must respect local decision-making, environmental protections, and climate resilience.
— 80% of any income from resource extraction, tourism, or development must go to local communities, with 20% allocated to the government.
— All agreements must include mechanisms for transparent leasing, criminal penalties for violations, and community-led monitoring systems.
— Democratically elected local bodies and governance system at the village, town, tehsil, district, is prerequisite to oversee land use, leasing, and benefit-sharing, with the government serving an oversight role only. All partnerships must be formalised through community development agreements that clearly outline rights, responsibilities, and safeguards.
The Land Reforms Act 2025 threatens to dismantle centuries-old indigenous stewardship and ignite social unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan. By replacing the exploitative Khalisa Sarkar model with an equally extractive bureaucratic regime, the government risks deepening local alienation and accelerating environmental degradation.
The path forward lies not in imposed reforms, but in empowering the people through recognition of customary law and inclusive, community-led governance. Anything less would be a betrayal of justice, democratic principles, and the trust of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
Ghulam Amin Beg is a community-driven development practitioner, conservationist, climate activist and policy analyst, currently residing in Islamabad with frequent development travels to tourist destinations in Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral. He contributes essays to High Asia Herald and baam-e-Jahan pages on social, cultural and political issues.
The High Asia Herald is a member of High Asia Media Group — a window to High Asia and Central Asia
6 thoughts on “Land Reforms Act: a legal overreach threatening indigenous rights”
Excellent article c
First, the Land Reforms Act 2025 is not a tool for elite capture or centralisation—it is a foundational attempt to resolve decades-old ambiguity over land classification, which has obstructed development, triggered community conflicts, and made the region vulnerable to informal and often exploitative land deals. In Hunza and other districts, unclear land ownership has hindered critical public infrastructure projects, from roads and schools to clean energy and tourism initiatives. Without a clear legal framework, both government and communities have remained in legal limbo—open to manipulation by private actors and incapable of attracting sustainable investment.
The previous Khalisa Sarkar model, a colonial relic, claimed vast expanses of land as “state property” without community consent—yet ironically, many critics now defend its resulting ambiguities in the name of customary law. The new Act is a bold step toward formalising community rights and finally replacing the colonial legacy with a structured, localised, and publicly accountable legal system.
Yes, the definition of “government land” must be clarified and judicial mechanisms strengthened. But the solution is constructive amendment and public engagement, not rejection. No legislation of this scale is born perfect. Its effectiveness depends on how we implement and evolve it with local input, especially from youth, women, and village institutions—groups that have historically been excluded from both rawaj and state structures.
Furthermore, critics argue the bill undermines Gilgit-Baltistan’s constitutional status. But ambiguity in status should not justify inaction or stagnation. Waiting for a plebiscite to resolve administrative and developmental paralysis is neither just nor practical. The people of GB need housing, jobs, climate resilience, and legal protection today—not in an undefined future. Strengthening internal governance does not violate international positions; it strengthens our case for inclusive, responsible self-administration.
Finally, we must reject the false binary between customary law and formal governance. The PPP and its coalition partners believe in integration—not erasure. This bill can and must coexist with the codification of rawaj, provided both are accountable, equitable, and inclusive of all voices—not just traditional male elders. Land cannot remain locked in oral traditions alone in an era of climate crisis, population growth, and digital governance.
To move forward, we invite scholars, community leaders, and civil society to engage not through fear-driven rhetoric but through participatory reform, proposing constructive amendments and mechanisms for oversight, consent, and benefit-sharing.
The Gilgit-Baltistan Land Reforms Act is not the end—it is the beginning of land justice, legal clarity, and empowered local development. Let’s shape it together.
Regards :
Naveed Ullah Baig
Deputy Information Secretary
Pakistan Peoples Party
Gilgit Baltistan
Hi,
Well narrated Both the Baig ‘s, but missed the authority’s given to ACs and DCs- ignoring the public representative, who is actually voice of the public, and always has to answerable to public of the 10 Districts of GB.
These public members are divide in two groups – due to not on boarding the CM- Council Members.
Well pointed by Amin, why not in a joint ventures with people of 10 Districts of any venues/ in all areas of natural resources with ratios of 80 and 20.
80% public approval should be prerequisite of any JVs/ projects – as the operators are bound regarding Environmental Laws for National and International JVs projects.
At last does all these JVs are as according to UN resolution about disputed area definitions, laws, procedures or principles??
If not what is alternate – relating GB with Kashmir as part of Pakistan and India. Pending with UN.
How the Gibians Look, the borrowed money from financial institutions – what the political parties given to GB during their ruling years need a serious thinking to give a shape of thoughts.
A very good attempt both by Amin Baig and Naveed ullah Baig. Both have reflected upon the current land reform bill critically. I perceive there are two areas, which need further clarity.
1. Classification of land, suchas;
a) Housing areas & orchards
b) Agriculture land already tilled land
c) Artificially grown forest land (jungle) by household owners or village collectively grown forest
d) Potentially arrable lands near oround the villages
e) High pastures with huts traditionally owned by villages for centuries
f) Mountains & Glaciers (Sources of water & Minerals)
2. Previously Khalisai Sarkar land in settled areas that were under the Muharaja of Kashmir or British government are now “The GB Government land”.
3. In the previous Rajwadas or Mirships of Hunza-Nagar & Diamer Division the ownership of land resources were owned by Rajas or Maliks & Watershed communities. There was nothing like Khalisai Sarkaar. Since the Miri system was abolished in 1972 (Nagar) & 1974 (Hunza) & were integrated into NAs as sub-districts.
4. A new Social Contract is needed between the people of Diamer; Hunza-Nagar & the GB Government. Since the entire region is in a Constitutional limbo; therefore, it is in the interest of the GB government to have a well-defined “Land Reform Bill” or Law that should clearly define the Rights of the indegenous population and the authority of the GB government.
5. I perceive that the decision making authority was and shall remain with the GB Judciary whereas, GB Police is & should act only when asked by any Majistrate or higher legal entity. Secondly, the GB Police can also act under special laws & circumstances to maintain law & order bringing peace to any turbulent situation.
6. The legislative body has the right to make amendments or formulate a new law to serve the interests of the populace in GB. Secondly, it can amend the laws to generate revenue for the smooth running of the government functionaries in GB including Legislation; Judiciary; Governance through various departments.
7. No additional administrative units or districts in the next 10 years. Only facilitation and further strengthening of current administrative units is required.
8. By ever expanding the administrative units without proper office buildings and other infrastructural facility sucks the already limited resource allocations for genuine development projects.
I have forwarded some ideas simply as a Sociologist with interests in Education, Rural Development, Environment Resilience and Social Activist.
I have just gone through the Gilgit-Baltistan Land Reform Act, 2024, here is my two cents; The definition of “Government” refers specifically to the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan, while “Government Land” includes land owned by federal government departments, authorities, or institutions. This creates a legal ambiguity that could lead to misinterpretation or conflict between provincial and federal ownership claims.
Sections 17 and 18 also require clearer legal framing.
Section 18 – Bar on Jurisdiction:
“Section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 shall mutatis mutandis apply to this Act.”
This means that civil courts are barred from hearing matters covered under this Act, similar to how Section 172 works in the original Land Revenue Act. As a result, local residents may have no legal avenue to challenge the decisions or actions of the revenue board in court.
Section 17 – Indemnity:
“Any officer or authority performing functions bona fide under this Act shall not be liable in any court of law. No suit shall lie against such officers for actions done in good faith.”
This section grants legal protection to officials acting in good faith under the Act. However, it lacks clarity on what happens if an officer acts in bad faith (malafide). There is no mention of who determines whether an action was in good or bad faith. This opens the door to potential misuse of authority and calls for clearer definitions, accountability mechanisms, or independent oversight in the legislation.
Additionally, the bill should include provisions for the protection of community-based conservation areas, especially those located on impartible common land. A similar community-led model could also be applied to oversee mining and other resource extraction, ensuring local stewardship and benefit sharing
Upon reviewing the bill, I didn’t notice any substantial criticisms beyond vague complaints or wishful thinking. The potential involvement of government functionaries in land apportionment decisions could be a notable concern. Additionally, the right to appeal and judicial oversight might be worth examining further. I also couldn’t find clarity on the status of protected areas within the bill, specifically whether they are subject to acquisition or allotment.